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35 U.S.C. § 287(C): LANGUAGE SLIGHTLY BEYOND
INTENT
Fariba Sirjanit
Dariush Keyhanitt
I.
INTRODUCTION

Medical treatment method patents are issued not for the drugs
or devices used for treating a patient, but for the actual steps taken by
a doctor during diagnosis or treatment. These patents are usually
issued to doctors who invent the method in the course of their practice.
A medical treatment method patent may be issued, for example, for a
method of making incisions for cataract surgery, for a regime of dosage
for administering a drug that overcomes the drug's side effects, or for
computer software interpreting the images obtained by a radiologist.'
With an enforceable medical treatment method patent, the patentee
could charge other doctors for the privilege of using the method on
2
patients or obtain an injunction against the use of the method by others.
Section 616 of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 1996, codified as 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), is generally considered to
t Associate with the intellectual property firm of Christie, Parker and Hale in Pasadena,
California. Patent Attorney registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office and admitted to the bar in the states of California and Arizona. Graduate Student
at the University of California-Davis in Electrical and Computer Engineering. With many
thanks to Professors Dennis Karjala & Shubha Ghosh for their gracious review and comments.
Note: The views expressed in this article are solely the views of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of any organization, firm or client with which the authors are
affiliated.
tt Visiting Professor of Law at Chungnam National University in Korea, LL.M.
(Candidate), New York University School of Law; M.S., Immunology, University of Rochester School of Medicine; J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo; M.S. Education,
University of Rochester; B.A., Cum Laude, University of Rochester. Mr. Keyhani is a
founding member of the law firm of Meredith & Keyhani, PLLC, a New York and New Jersey
law firm with a practice focused on intellectual property law matters.
See, e.g., Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050 (D.Vt. 1995); Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. FH Faulding & Co. Ltd., [2000] FCA 316; Warren D. Woessner and Michael A.
Dryja, PatentLaw Amendment ProvidesSwift Relieffor US Doctors, IP Worldwide Magazine,
March/April 1997. For other examples of medical treatment method patents issued by the U.S.
Patent Office, see e.g., William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 651, 660 (1995), Wendy W. Yang, Note, PatentPolicy and
Medical ProcedurePatents: The Casefor Statutory Exclusion From Patentability, I B.U. J.
Sci. & TECH. L. 5, *1, n.3 (1995), or Gregory F. Burch, Note, Ethical Considerationsin the
PatentingofMedical Processes, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1139 (1987).
2

35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 283-285 (2004).
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create a liability exception for medical practitioners infringing medical
treatment method patents while performing a medical activity with the
goal of treating a human being. 3 Under 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), a medical
practitioner who infringes a medical treatment method patent is immune from liability to the patentee if he infringes the patent during the
performance of a medical activity.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) was enacted with the goal of harmonizing
U.S. law with international and foreign laws. 4 International treaties
permit exclusion of medical treatment methods from the categories of
patentable subject matter and the patent laws of most countries make
medical treatment methods unpatentable. 5 The medical doctors' lobby
in the U.S. argued for a similar provision which would have prevented
3 "(1) With respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical activity that
constitutes an infringement under section 271 (a) or (b) of this title, the provisions of sections
281 [providing a civil remedy for patent infringement], 283 [allowing for injunction in the
event of patent infringement], 284 [providing for damages in the event of patent infringement]
and 285 [providing for attorneys tees] of this title shall not apply against the medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical activity. (2) For the
purposes of this subsection ... (E) the term 'body' shall mean a human body, organ or cadaver,
or a nonhuman animal used in medical research or instruction directly relating to the treatment
of humans." 35 U.S.C. 287(c)(1)-(2) (2004); Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of
1996 § 616, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat., 3009 (codified as 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1994) Supp. II
1996 & Supp. IV 1998).
4 "The proponents of H.R. 1127 and S. 1334 have argued that many countries exclude
therapeutic and diagnostic methods from patent protection and that the United States should
follow their lead and 'harmonize' our law with theirs." U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
"Notice of Hearings and Request for Comments on Issues Relating to Patents Protection for
Therapeutic and Diagnostic Methods," 61 Fed. Reg. at 10320-23 (March 13, 1996). H.R. 1127
was introduced to exclude such methods from patentability and S. 1334 was to grant limited
immunity from patent infringement to certain persons. S. 1334 resulted in 35 U.S.C. § 287(c).
See also Testimony of Charles D. Kelman, M.D., President American Society of Cataract and
Refractive Surgery, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property Hearing on H.R. 1127, "Medical Procedures Innovation and Affordability Act",
October 19, 1995, http://web.archive.org/web/20031222171101/
http://www.ascrs.org/
advocacy/testimny.html ("H.R. 1127 follows the lead of over 80 other countries that have
banned medical procedure patents.").
5 Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") (Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade In Counterfeit Goods Final Act Embodying
The Results Of The Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 27
§ 3(a), 33 I.L.M. 1, 83-111) (1994), and the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") (Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1709, § 3(a), 32 I.L.M. 605, 670-81), member states are
allowed to exclude medical procedures from patentability. Also by the time of passage of the
law leading to enactment of 35 U.S.C.§ 287(c) in 1996, more than 80 countries in Europe, Asia,
Africa, North America, South America and Central America, exempted medical methods from
patent protection. Robert M. Portman, Legislative Restriction on Medical and Surgical
Procedure Patents Removes Impediment to Medical Progress,4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
91, 98 (1996).
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granting patents to medical treatment methods in the U.S. as well. 6 An
unpatentability provision was fiercely opposed by other lobby groups
such as the trial lawyers and biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries who depend on patenting. 7 As a compromise, medical treatment
methods remained patentable under U.S. law, but the patents granted
on such methods were declared unenforceable against infringing
doctors. 8
The debates leading to the enactment of the statute indicate a
focus on immunity against infringement of medical treatment method
patents. 9 The commentators who have discussed 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)
6 The statute was enacted in the aftermath of a lawsuit by one doctor against another for
infringing a medical treatment method patent and it was brought about by lobby efforts of
physicians' organizations that found such lawsuits, hence the existence of medical treatment
method patents, offensive to their profession. Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050 (D.
Vt. 1995). As an example of the concerns raised regarding this lawsuit, see e.g., Wendy W.
Yang, Note, Patent Policy and Medical Procedure Patents: The Case for Statutory Exclusion
From Patentability, 1 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 5, 2 (1995) ("Dr. Samuel Pallin, who held a patent
on a procedure for performing cataract surgery without sutures, initiated what legal experts
think is the first American patent infringement suit involving a medical procedure patent and
a physician defendant. If he prevails in court, Dr. Pallin plans to charge ophthalmologists
nationwide a royalty for using his procedure. If the estimates are correct that up to half of all
cataract procedures performed in the United States involve Dr. Pallin's technique, a decision in
Dr. Pallin's favor could result in a significant cost increase to patients and the health care
system in general.") (footnotes omitted).
7 See, e.g., Robert M. Portman, Legislative Restriction on Medical and Surgical Procedure Patents Removes Impediments to Medical Progress,4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91,
113 (1996) ("[35 U.S.C. § 287(c)] was championed by two physician-legislators: Congressman
Greg Ganske of Iowa and Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee, and passed over the vigorous
opposition of Senator Orrin Hatch, who, as Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, had
primary jurisdiction over the patent statute.")
8 "Amending section 287(c) greased organized medicine's squeaky wheel. Section 287(c)
statutorily immunized licensed medical practitioners from infringement of medical process
patents. Section 287(c) did not affect the biotechnology industry because the patenting of
medical processes survived unmolested." Weldon E. Havins, Immunizing the MedicalPractitioner "Process" Infringer: Greasingthe Squeaky Wheel, Good PublicPolicy, Or What? 77
U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 51, 69 (1999) (footnotes omitted). This commentator, perhaps
correctly, states that the true and main impetus behind 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) was the fact that
doctors did not appreciate the specter of one doctor suing another: "[I]n an overall sense, all
this legislative maneuvering amounted to 'much ado about nothing.' Section 287(c) merely
formalized the status quo in existence prior to the Pallin v. Singer infringement action. Prior
to Pallin, medical practitioners did not sue one another for patent infringement. Section 287(c)
merely statutorily recognizes that gentlemen's understanding." Id.
9 Some of the other terms used to refer to the same general concept are: medical process
patents, medical procedure patents, medical and surgical procedure patents, medical therapy
patents, patents on methods or modes of treatment by physicians of certain diseases, patents on
methods of treating the human body, surgical or medical procedure, surgical or medical
therapy, or making a diagnosis. Weldon E. Havins, Immunizing the Medical Practitioner
"Process" Infringer: Greasing the Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, Or What? 77 U. DET.
MERCY L. REv. 51, 69 (1999); Duane Nash, Recommended Response for Human Cloning
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after its enactment also seemingly take for granted that the statute was
meant to limit the enforceability of medical treatment method patents.' 0
The legislative history hints at the same. 1 If the statute was indeed
intended to pertain to medical treatment method patents alone, then
writing it with language in accord with foreign laws would have given
the courts and others tasked with interpretation of the statute the benefit
of the interpretations already on record in other countries. The straightforward language of most foreign law that is patterned after the same
international treaty approximately states that methods for treatment of
the human body by surgery or therapy or methods of diagnosis shall not
be regarded as inventions. Instead, the language of 287(c) states:
"With respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical
activity that constitutes an infringement ... the provisions of sections

[on various infringement remedies] shall not apply against the medical
practitioner

.... "

This novel language, introduced by the U.S. legisla-

ture under pressure from lobby groups, forces the courts and practitioners to guess at the meaning without the aid of any authoritative or
persuasive precedent.
This paper admits that the language of 287(c) achieves the
intended goal of the legislature in immunizing doctors against liability
for infringement of medical treatment method patents. The paper also
admits that, in practice and under most likely fact scenarios, the reach
of the statute will end at immunizing doctors against liability for
infringement of medical treatment method patents alone. But the paper
points out that, under the language of this statute, a doctor may be
immune from liability for infringement of any type of process patent,
however unlikely a corresponding fact scenario. 12 The text of the statute
Patent Applications, 42 IDEA 279, 296 and 301 (2000); Robert M. Portman, Legislative
Restriction on Medical and Surgical Procedure Patents Removes Impediment to Medical
Progress,4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91 (1996). The terms "method" and "procedure" are
equivalent to the term "process" as used by the patent statute permitting the patenting of an
invention representing a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1994, Supp. 11 1996 & Supp. IV 1998).
10 See infra section III.C.
,1 The Senate Bill whose passage resulted in enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) was
introduced as: "S. 1334--A bill to amend chapter 28 of title 35, United States Code, to provide

for noninfringing uses of patents on medical and surgical procedures." S.1334, 104th Cong.
(1995), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c104:S.1334.IS:; See also H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 863, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1996).
12 Of course, the patents that are expressly excluded by the statute are spared. However,

not all the industries whose patents may someday be implicated were present during the debate
in order to obtain an exception.
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does not specify the type of patent whose infringement is immune from
liability and the associated conference report uses the same general
language of the statute, failing to explain that the immunity is limited
to infringement of medical treatment method patents.13
Under subsection (c)(2), infringing use of a patented machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, and infringing use of a drug use
process patent or a biotechnology process patent are expressly excluded from the immunity granted,' 4 leaving the infringement of other
patented processes subject to immunity. Apparently, at no point did
anyone involved consider that a doctor may need or wish to infringe a
process patent other than a drug use process or biotechnology process
patent or a medical treatment process patent during the performance of
a medical activity. 15 As a result, nowhere did the legislature state that,
aside from the expressly excluded process patents, it was considering
medical treatment method patents only and that it did not intend to
extend the immunity to infringement of other process patents.
The text of the statute allows a medical practitioner to evade
liability for infringement of a process patent in any art area, not just the
medical arts, as long as he does so in the course of performing a
medical activity, and as long as the process patent infringed is not
found to be a drug use or a biotechnology patent. As such, 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(c) was written more broadly than the legislature intended and the
commentators foresaw. Considering that nothing to the contrary is
found in the main piece of legislative history, the current textualist
tendency of the courts 16 will likely cause a literal interpretation of the
statute. 17 Passage of time and changing circumstances or certain fact
'3 Refer to Appendix B of this paper including § 616 of the Conference Report to
accompany H.R. 3610, 104th Cong. (1996).
14 "For the purposes of this subsection: (A) the term 'medical activity' means the
performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use of
a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the
practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the
practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent." 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2).
15Cf Gunfest, Joseph A. and A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple PersonalityDisor-

ders: The Value ofnAmbiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation,54 STAN. L. REV. 627
(2002) (Explaining that the legislature intentionally introduce ambiguity into a statute as a
means of compromise and exploring the dynamics of exploiting the ambiguity).
16See infra section IV.C.
17 Refer to Appendix B of this paper including § 616 of the § 616 of the Conference
Report to accompany H.R. 3610, 104th Cong. (1996).
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patterns may prompta judge to construe this overbroad statute according to its express language.18 For example, a medical practitioner may
be held liable for infringement of a patent drawn to a method of
hypnotism because practicing the method is not deemed a medical
activity. The same medical practitioner, however, may evade liability
for using the same patented method if he calls the practice of the
method performance of a medical activity or if he embeds the patented
method into a medical activity. The same holds true for any nonmedical cosmetic procedure.
This paper includes five sections in addition to this Introduction. Section II creates the proper perspective by presenting the welldeveloped international and foreign laws regarding medical treatment
method patents that were the true target of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). Section
III presents the national background against which 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)
was enacted, the proponent and opponent lobbies, and the national
debate preceding and succeeding the statute. Section IV looks at the
language of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) that came about as a result of lobbyists
pushing and pulling at the tried and true foreign examples. This section
points out some of the challenges facing a judge attempting to construe
the statute as well as the potential role of the legislative history.
Section V shows that while the statutory language covers medical
treatment method patents, it is not specific to them and may reach
farther than that intended by the legislature or contemplated by the
commentators. Section VI concludes the paper by arguing that the far
reach of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) immunizes medical practitioners from
liability for infringement of not just treatment method patents but
process patents in any area other than those expressly excluded.
II.
How FOREIGN COUNTRIES TREAT MEDICAL TREATMENT METHODS

Medical treatment methods are not patentable in most other countries.
Because 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) was enacted to bring U.S. law more in step
with laws of other countries, this paper begins with the international
law that influenced the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) and with an
18 A case in point is the evolution of the requirement of enablement under 35 U.S.C. §
112 into two distinct requirements of enablement and written description in more recent years
due to the progresses made first in the chemical and later in the biotechnical arts. "New
interpretations of old statutes in light of new fact situations occur all the time." Enzo Biochem,
Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F3d 956, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J., concurring on denial of
petition for rehearing en banc).
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overview of EPO law as an example of a well-developed foreign law
regarding treatment methods.
A. TRIPs Provisionson Patentabilityof Medical Treatment Methods
In 1994, the signatory nations to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") signed the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs") that creates an international baseline for patent; trademark, and copyright protection.
TRIPs provides procedures for settlement of property disputes and
harmonizes the world patent laws. 19 In harmonizing world patent laws,
TRIPs makes it permissive but not mandatory for signatory countries
to exclude treatment methods from the categories of patentable subject
matter. "Members may also exclude from patentability: (a) diagnostic,
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or
animals. '20 By 1996, the time that 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) was signed into
law, more than 80 countries had excluded the methods of treatment of
2
people or animals from patentability. '
Methods of medical treatment of people or animals are called by different names in
relevant provisions of different countries. TRIPs refers to them as "diagnostic, therapeutic and
surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals." Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IC, art. 27 [hereinafter TRIPs]. The European Patent
Convention ("EPC") refers to them as "[miethods for treatment of the human or animal body
by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal body."
European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 52(4). This paper uses the term "medical
treatment method" or "treatment method" to refer to the concept generally encompassed by all
of the foregoing.
20 TRIPs art. 27.
21 See, e.g., Medical ProceduresInnovation andAffordability Act andInventor Protection
Act of 1995, hearing on H.R. 1127 before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property (1995) (statement of Charles D. Kelman, M.D., President American
Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery, available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20031222171101/http://www.ascrs.org/advocacy/testinmy.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005)
("H.R. 1127 follows the lead of over 80 other countries that have banned medical procedure
patents."). In Brazil, operating or surgical techniques and therapeutic or diagnostic methods
for use on human and animal body are not considered to be inventions under Article 10, section
VIII of the Brazilian patent law. Canada does not permit claims to methods of medical
treatment, using pharmaceuticals or otherwise. Tennessee Eastman Co. v. Commissioner of
Patents, [1972] S.C.R. (2d) 202. According to Article 25.1.3 of the Chinese patent law, no
patent right shall be granted to methods for the diagnosis or for treatment of diseases.
According to Article 21, paragraph 1, subparagraph 1 of the Taiwan patent law, diagnostic,
therapeutic, or surgical methods for diseases of humans or animals are unpatentable subject
matter. Methods of treatment are not patentable under section 7(1) of the Israeli patent law.
According to Article 29, paragraph I of the Korean patent act, if a process or method of
treatment using pharmaceuticals is substantially practiced on the human body, a patent application for such a process or method is considered to lack industrial applicability and is not
19
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B. The EPO Example

The European Patent Office (EPO) grants European patents for
the contracting states to the European Patent Convention (EPC), which
has been in force since 1977.22 The EPC is the executive arm of the
European Patent Organization, an intergovernmental body whose
members are the EPC contracting states. A European patent can be
obtained by filing a single application in one of the official languages
of the EPO (English, French or German) and is valid in as many of the
contracting states as the applicant cares to designate. A European
patent affords the same rights in the designated contracting states as a
23
national patent granted in any of the member states.
EPC Article 52, which takes into account the permissive exclusion of treatment patents by TRIPs, recites in relevant sections:
European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve
an inventive step.
Methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery
or therapy and diagnostic methods practiced in the human or animal
body shall not be regarded as inventions which are susceptible of
industrial application within the meaning of paragraph 1. This provision shall not apply to products, in particular substances or composi24
tions, for use in any of these methods.
patentable, whereas, a process or method of treatment practiced on animals and not humans is
recognized to have patentability. Methods of treatment or diagnosis or surgical methods
applicable to the human or animal bodies are not considered inventions according to Article
19, point VII of the Mexican patent law. Subsection 25(11) of the South African patents act
provides that a method of treatment of human or animal body by surgery or therapy or of
diagnosis is not a patentable invention. One notable exception to the foreign pattern is
Australian law that does not include any provisions against patenting of methods of treatment
of humans or animals. In contrast, New Zealand does not permit issue of patents to methods
of medical treatment for humans while allowing methods of treatment of animals to be
patented, available at http://www.med.govt.nz/buslt/intprop/patentsreview/cabinet/partl/
section5.html
22 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268, available
at http://www~european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/contents.html [hereinafter EPC].
23 EPC's contracting states as of June 2003 are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hellenic Republic, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, available
at http://www.mewbum.com/Mewsletter/ 20Aug%2003.pdf.
24 The EPC language "being susceptible of industrial application" is parallel to the
"utility" requirement under 35 U.S.C. §101 (2004) and the EPC language "involving an
inventive step" is parallel to the "nonobvious" requirement under 35 U.S.C. §103 (2004).
Further, the "novelty" requirement of EPC is parallel to the "novelty" requirement under 35
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The EPC expressly excludes treatment methods of both humans
and animals from patentability. 5 The EPC refers to "methods for
treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and
diagnostic methods practised on human or animal body." 26 This
wording is patterned after TRIPs terminology of "diagnostic, therapeu27
tic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals.
EPO technical boards of appeal have interpreted and applied this
provision in numerous cases. In particular, "what constitutes a method
for treatment" has been the subject of much litigation before the EPO,
28
giving rise to a considerable body of law.
At one extreme of the spectrum of cases deciding whether a
treatment method is at issue lie surgical procedures and methods of
alleviating pain and suffering that are for the most part unpatentable.
Under the EPC, surgical procedures are not patentable whether or not
their intended purpose is therapeutic, cosmetic, or otherwise. 29 Nontherapeutic treatment methods are patentable if the non-therapeutic
effect is distinct and separate from any therapeutic effect.30 Thus, for
example, purely cosmetic treatment methods, that are not surgical
either, are patentable. 3' But if the cosmetic effect is linked to a
therapeutic effect that may also be occurring, then the treatment
method is not purely cosmetic and is not patentable. 32 All methods
practiced on the human or animal body which are related to diagnosis
or which are of value for the purpose of diagnosis, irrespective of
whether a physician could immediately decide on a course of treatment
33
on the basis of the results obtained, are banned from patentability.
U.S.C. § 102 (2004). Making the analogy to U.S. law, methods of treatment are rejected by the
EPC as unpatentable subject matter for failure to meet the industrial "utility" requirement.
25 EPC art. 52(4) http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar52.html#A52.
26 Id.
27 TRIPs art. 27(3).
28 See, e.g., Colm Murphy, Methods of Treatment: Is There Any Protection Available in
Europe, availableat http://www.boult.com/information/ArticlePrint.cfm?ArticlelD=34; Todd
Martin, Patentabilityof Methods of Medical Treatment: A Comparative Study, 82 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 389 (2000).
29 Case T 182/90, Shell Biotechnology v. Blood Flow, 1994 O.J. EPO 641, 26 IIC 87
(1995), availableat http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t900182exl .pdf.
30 Case T 182/90, Blood Flow, 1994 O.J. EPO 641, 26 IIC 87 (1995).
31 European Patents Handbook, ( 2 nd ed. 1988) Rel 24 (1996), point 3.5.3(B).
32 See generally, Case T 780/89, Immunostimulant, 1993 O.J. EPO 440,25 IIC 82 (1994);
Case T 144/83, Appetite Suppressant/Dupont, 1986 O.J. EPO 301, 18 IIC 258 (1987); Case T
290/86, Cleaning Plaque/ICI, 1992 O.J. EPO 414, 23 IIC 815 (1992).
33 Case T 0964/99, Device and Method for Sampling Substances Using Alternating
Polarity/Cygnus, Inc. 2002 O.J. EPO.
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Diagnostic methods performed on cells in a culture, or a sample
obtained from a patient are both patentable. 34 Neither prophylactic nor
curative methods are patentable, and arguing that a method should be
patentable because it is preventative and not curative is not persuasive
in Europe. 35 At the other extreme lie pharmaceuticals or surgical
36
devices that are clearly patentable.

Cases that come before a tribunal generally involve middle of
the spectrum categories such as cosmetic methods, methods for curing
baldness, infertility, or obesity, use of contraceptives, methods of
reducing the desire to smoke, or diagnostic testing methods. Case law

of the EPO and other foreign jurisdictions that consider treatment
methods unpatentable, often decides whether or not such middle of the
spectrum categories should be considered unpatentable treatment
methods. 37 For example, contraceptive methods are patentable because
they are not considered to be therapeutic. Yet, claims to a method of
34 Case T 385/86, Non-invasive Measurement, 1988 O.J. EPO 308, 20 IIC 75 (1989);
Case T 245/87, Flow Measurement/Siemens, 1989 O.J. EPO 171, 20 IIC 878 (1989); Case T
82/93, Cardiac Pacing, 1996 O.J. EPO 274, 28 IIC 90 (1997).
35 Case T 19/86, Pigs II/Duphar, 1989 O.J. EPO 24, 20 IIC 196 (1989).
36 At times a method of treatment may be merely a new use for a known pharmaceutical.
In these circumstances, whether a claim is found patentable or not depends on the format of the
claim. If the method sets forth a use for a compound for the first time, it is called a first use
claim. For the first medical use of a known compound, which has not been previously
disclosed as having medical utility, the claim would generally recite: "A compound of formula
X for use in a method of treatment of the human or animal body by therapy." A method of use
of a compound, already known to treat a certain medical condition, to treat yet another medical
condition is called a second or subsequent use claim and generally uses a format as follows:
"Use of compound X in the manufacture of a medicament for the treatment of condition Y."
An example of this second medical use is the use of aspirin to reduce the risk of heart attacks.
Second use claims are also called Swiss-type claims and are patentable in the EPO. Case Gr.
5/83, Second Medical Use, 1985 O.J. EPO 64, 16 IIC 83 (1985) (EPO Enlarged Tech. Bd. Of
App.); Case T 143/94, Trigonelline, 1996 O.J. EPO 430, 28 IIC 95, 96 (1997); Case T 128/82,
Pyrrolidine Derivatives/Hoffman- La Roche, 1984 O.J. EPO 174, 15 IIC 520 (1984). The term
Swiss comes from a 1984 decision of the Swiss Intellectual Property Office to allow claims in
this form. Therefore, the protection that cannot be achieved through the use of a "medical
treatment" claim can some times be achieved through a "new use of a pharmaceutical" claim.
37 Form of the claim may be important in some situations. A claim to a blood extraction
method for facilitating sustained venous blood flow through a limb to an extraction point
wherein limb stimulus means were activated to provide a stimulus was found patentable. EPO
TBA, T 0329/94. The technical board found that the method did not cure an ailment and was
thus not a therapeutic method, it did not involve reaching a diagnosis and was not a diagnostic
method, and the method itself did not involve surgery either. The technical board, therefore,
decided that the claim was essentially a product claim to a stimulus means. Had it found the
claim drawn to a blood extraction method, it would not have allowed the claim as patentable.
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contraception were refused where the treatment involved the administration of two different hormones at different times in the menstrual
cycle, one of the hormones being included so as to have a prophylactic
effect to counter adverse effects that had been associated with the use
of the other. 38 The fact that the use of one of the required elements was
clearly unpatentable rendered the whole method of use claim unpatentable.
Certain indicators are used by the EPO in deciding patentability. For example, if a medical practitioner is required to carry out the
method, it is a likely indicator that a method of treatment is being
performed which is not patentable. 39 However, a method that can be
carried out by non-medical practitioners may still be an unpatentable
method of treatment. 40 Or, in contrast to procedures whose end result
is the death of the living being "under treatment," either deliberately or
incidentally (e.g., the slaughter of animals or methods for measuring
biological functions of an animal which comprise the sacrificing of said
animal 41 ), those physical interventions on the human or animal body
which give priority to maintaining the life or health of the body on
which they are performed are, "in their nature," methods for treatment
42
by surgery within the meaning of Article 52(4) EPC.
III.
THE NATIONAL SCENE

This section skims the U.S. law regarding patentability of
treatment methods prior to enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), the people
and policies that formed the statute, and the consensus of the commentators regarding what the statute meant to accomplish.
A. Patentabilityof Treatment Methods Priorto 35 U.S.C. § 28 7(c)
In 1994, Congress passed the Uruguay Round Agreement Act
to implement changes to the U.S. patent law required by TRIPs. Prior
to the passage of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act and adoption of
TRIPs, whether medical and surgical methods constituted patentable
subject matter had long been controversial in the U.S. 4 3 As TRIPs does
38

Case T 820/92, Contraceptive method/The General Hospital, O.J. EPO 113 (1995).

39 Case T 24/92, Cornea, 1995 O.J. EPO 512, 27 IIC 530 (1996).
40

Id.

41 See Case T 182/90, Blood Flow, 1994 O.J. EPO 641, 26 IIC 87 (1995).
42

Case T 35/99, Pericardial Access/Georgetown University, 2000 O.J. EPO 447.

43 1 Donald S. Chisum, Patents § 1.03[3] (2002).
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not make it mandatory to categorically exclude treatment methods from
patentability, while the EPC and most other signatories chose to make
this category unpatentable, U.S. did not choose to do the same.
Chisum presents a history of treatment method patents in the
U.S. that follows. 44 The seminal case involved a patent claiming
performance of surgical operations by combining the surgical operation with the application of ether.45 The language of this case created
the notion that medical and surgical methods were not patentable
processes and this notion lasted until the 1930s. In 1930 the courts
started upholding patents on medical diagnosis and treatment
methods. 46 In 1951, the Fourth Circuit, while invalidating the challenged patents, confirmed the patentability of treatment methods. 47 In
1954, the Board of Appeals of the Patent Office permitted patenting of
some treatment methods. 48 In doing so, the Board overruled an earlier
decision that had had the impact of excluding all medical treatment
49
methods from patentability.
In more recent years, patents issuing to medical treatment
methods have become more common.50 By 1996 it was estimated that
the Patent Office had been issuing as many as 15 medical procedure
51
patents per week.
In Pallin v. Singer, the case that triggered the concems of the
medical community, one doctor filed a patent infringement case against
another alleging infringement of a patent issued to the plaintiff for a
44

Id.

45 Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879 (S.D.N.Y 1862).
46

Dick v. Lederle Antitoxin Labs., 43 F.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).

47 Martin v. Wyeth, 193 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1951).
48

Ex Parte Scherer, 103 USPQ 107 (Bd. Patent Appeals 1954).

49 Ex Parte Brinkerhoff, 24 Commr's MS Decision 349,27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 797 (1883).
50 See, e.g., Smith and Nephew Inc. v. Ethicon Inc., 54 USPQ2d 1888, 1889 (D. Ore.

1999) (involving a patent claiming a method of attaching tissue to bone by using a resilient
suture anchor which is pressed into a hole in the bone); Catapano v. Wyeth Ayerst Pharms.
Inc., 88 F.Supp.2d 27, 28 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (involving a method of treating a human patient to
effect the remission of AIDS by administering a typhoid vaccine to the patient and a patent for
treating psoriasis with typhoid vaccine); for more cases involving treatment method patents see
also Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 228 F.Supp.2d 480 (D. Del. 2002) and
Pharmastem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12592, 2002
WL1477380 (D. Del.).
51 Brett G. Alten, Left to One's Devices: Congress Limits Patents on Medical Procedures, 8 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 837, 838 (1998); Susan Leach DeBlasio,
Patents on Medical Procedures and the Physician Profiteer, available at http://
www.tlslaw.com/publications/medpatents.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2005).
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surgical technique used during cataract surgery. 52 The court in Pallin
v. Singer, invalidated some of the claims of Pallin's patent and enjoined him from enforcing the rest. This case, nonetheless, created the
53
political impetus which resulted in enactment of 35 U.S.C § 287(c).
B. Proponents and Opponents of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)
This section lists the lobby groups on opposing sides of H.R.
3610, passed in September of 1996 which gave rise to Public Law
104-208 that was in turn codified into 35 U.S.C. §287(c), and summarizes some of their arguments.
The Medical Procedure Patent Coalition, a coalition of medical
and surgical specialty societies, lobbied for amending the patent statute
to do away with medical procedure patents. In addition to the American Medical Association (AMA), the Medical Procedure Patent Coalition included all of the following medical societies: American Society
of Cataract and Refractive Surgery, American Academy of Dermatology, American Academy of Ophthalmology, American Academy of
Orthopedic Surgeons, American Academy of Otolaryngology Head
and Neck Surgery, American Association of Neurological Surgery,
American College of Radiology, American College of Surgeons,
American Institute of Ultrasound in Medicine, American Society of
Dermatologic Surgery, American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive
Surgery, American Urological Association, Association of American
Medical Colleges, Society of Cardiovascular and Interventional Surgery, and Society of Vascular Technology.
The Clinton administration's Department of Commerce (that
oversees the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office), the American Bar
Association (ABA), the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), and the
Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturer's Association (PhRMA) lobbied against amending the patent statute.
In the debate over the pros and cons of making treatment
methods unpatentable or at least limiting liability for infringement of
treatment method patents, one side argued doctors had an ethical obliga52

Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050 (D. Vt. 1995).

" See, e.g., Weldon E. Havins, Immunizing the MedicalPractitioner"Process" Infringer: Greasing the Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, Or What? 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
51 (1999); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies under Patents on Medical and Surgical Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 789 (1996).
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tion to share their innovations; 54 the other side argued that the doctors
should profit from their innovations. 55 One side argued that doctors
have been and will be innovating the same with or without an added
profit incentive; the other side argued that doctors should be given the
incentive of profiting from their innovations like everyone else. One
side argued that U.S. law should be in step with international law which
banned patenting of treatment methods; the other side argued that U.S.
law should keep its differences with the laws of other countries and use
them as a bargaining chip in international negotiations. One side
argued patenting would add to the cost of health care; the other side
argued that many factors, such as regulations, add to the cost of health
care but were nonetheless necessary. These arguments reflect the
policies considered during the debate and the meaning of the resulting
statute. Certain other policy considerations, expressed by foreign
jurisdictions in forming their respective laws, were not raised by the
56
U.S. Commentators.
54 The AMA presented professional and ethical concerns regarding patenting of treatment
methods. American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and JudicialAffairs, Ethical
Issues in the Patenting of Medical Procedures, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341, 344-348 (1998).
The World Medical Association agreed with the AMA and on similar grounds. World Medical
Association Statement on Medical Process Patents, Adopted by the 51St World Medical
Assembly, Tel Aviv, October 1999, availableat http://www.wma.net/e/policy/m30.htm. Both
AMA and WMA distinguished patents on medical devices and pharmaceuticals from treatment
method patents. They seemed to believe that patents on medical devices and pharmaceuticals
are not offensive to the medical profession because the manufacturers of the devices and the
drugs are not bound by the same ethical considerations as doctors. Further, these industries
need the profit incentive in order to innovate whereas the doctors' incentives should lie
elsewhere as far as the AMA and WMA were concerned. AMA was also concerned about the
quality of patents issued by the Patent and Trademark Office in general. Both associations
indicated distaste for exposing the image of their profession to the indignity of litigation
amongst colleagues. In addition to the AMA and its various members, the lawyers who
represented the coalition of medical and surgical specialty societies presented arguments in
support of the limitation of liability granted by the statute. Robert M. Portman, Legislative
Restriction on Medical and SurgicalPatents Removes Impediments to Medical Progress,4 U.
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91 (1996).
55 On the other side, AILPA considered the incentive driven patent system a constitutional
mandate and argued for keeping the system intact, available at http://www.aipla.org. Most
other views expressed in the literature are by patent practitioners that benefit from maximizing
the number of patents filed and do not wish to see the number of patentable categories or
recovery for infringement of patents, hence the incentive to sue, limited. Steven L. Nichols,
Hippocrates,the Patent Holder: The unenforceabilityof Medical ProcedurePatent, 5 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 227(1997); Brett G. Alten, Left to One's Devices: CongressLimits Patents on
MedicalProcedures,8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 837, 841 (1998); Richard
P. Burgoon, Jr., Silk Purses, Sows Ears and Other Nuances Regarding 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 4
U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. (1996). These practitioners argued that a correct balance of policy
interests did not require limiting the liability of infringers.
56 Several relevant considerations were not expressed by the commentators. One
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C. Consensus of Commentators

The literature commenting on 35 U.S.C § 287(c) is almost
unanimous in expressing or implying that this statute grants immunity
to medical practitioners against liability for infringement of medical
treatment method patents only.
Some examples of the consensus are cited in this paragraph.
"The current controversy over the patentability of medical procedures
began in 1993 .... "A concern among medical professionals is that
the existence of patents on therapeutic and diagnostic methods has a
chilling effect on the study of such procedures. '58 "This note examines
"-57

the controversial medical procedure patent legislation .... "59

The

debate leading to the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) generally argued
whether "Congress should amend the patent statute to exclude medical
procedures from the definition of patentable material. ' 60 "More recently, there was a renewed effort to exclude medical procedures
such consideration is the volume of treatment method innovations originating in a contry. For
example, because New Zealand has a significant livestock industry, it is likely that the number
of innovative methods of treatment of animals originating from this country would be large in
proportion to the number of such methods originating from other countries. Available at
http://www.med.govt.nz/bust/int-prop/patentsreview/cabinet/partI/section5.html.
This imbalance provides New Zealand an interest in protecting methods of treatment of animals.
Accordingly, New Zealand has opted to make methods of treatment of humans unpatentable
while allowing methods of treatment of animals to be patentable. Id. For other countries,
differentiating between the patents drawn to methods of treatment of humans and animals may
not be as crucial. See also Todd Martin, Patentabilityof Methods of Medical Treatment: A
Comparative Study, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y, 389 (2000). Considering the
magnitude of research and development in the medical field in U.S., this country is likely to be
a net exporter of medical patents of all types benefiting from the patentability of such methods.
Another unexpressed consideration that may have been implicit in the ethical arguments of the
AMA and the associated coalition is the duty to alleviate pain and suffering. Along these lines,
the EPC forbids patenting of treatment methods for humans and animals alike. In interpreting
the EPC provision, an EPO technical board has decided that even though treatment of animals
is commonly an aspect of agriculture and even though agricultural methods in general are
potentially patentable subject matter, nevertheless, methods of treatment of animals are not
patentable subject matter. European Patent Office, Decision of Technical Board of Appeal
3.2.2 (September 29, 1999) T 0035/99-3.2.2, available at http://legal.european-patentoffice.org/dg3/biblio/t990035epl.htm.
57 Bradley J. Meier, The New Patent Infringement Liability Exception for Medical
Procedures, 23 J. Legis. 265, 265 (1997).
5861 Fed. Reg. at 10320-23.
59Supra note 57.
60Wendy W. Wang, Patent Policy and Medical Procedure Patents: The Case for Statutory
Exclusion from Patentability, 1 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 5, *4 (1995).
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from the scope of the Patent Act in response to a strong medical lobby
asserting that doctors should not be liable for infringement of medical
procedure patents. Although these efforts did not ultimately alter the
scope of patentable subject matter, the legislation Congress did enact
deprives medical procedure patent owners from any remedies against
doctors who infringe and may thus make the scope of patentable
subject matter an empty promise for such inventions." 61 "Responding
to concerns raised by medical professionals over patents issued on
surgical techniques ... Congress in 1996 enacted 35 U.S.C. § 287(c),
which provides that the remedies against patent infringement shall not
apply to medical practitioners and related health entities for performance of a medical activity. ' 62 "On September 30, 1996, Congress
included a limitation on medical procedure patent infringement in the
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997. The provision,
section 287(c), created a safe haven from patent infringement liability
under certain circumstances. Proponents of section 287(c) argue that it
addresses problems with medical procedure patents and the infringement lawsuits that naturally flow from the ownership and enforcement
of those patents." 63 "The intent of Public Law 104-208 [codified as 35
U.S.C. § 287(c)] is to deny these rights to a patent owner if the subject
of the patent is purely a medical or surgical procedure. The result
renders any such patent virtually worthless." 64 "This section amends
35 U.S.C. § 287 to prevent the enforcement of medical procedure
patents against medical practitioners .... "65

According to these commentators and many more, 35 U.S.C. §
287(c) was enacted to allow medical practitioners to practice a patented
treatment method without liability for infringing the patent. The fact
61

Cynthia M. Ho, International and Comparative Law Issues: Splicing Morality and

Patent Law: Issues Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol'y 247, 254, n
32 (2000) (citations omitted). Cf., Richard Neifeld, Analysis of the New Patent Laws Enacted
November 29, 1999, 82 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 181, 202 (2000) (Using the phrase "any
patent" but replacing this general phrase with the more focused "medical procedure method

claims" in the subsequent sentence:

"35 USC 287(c)(4) is amended to exclude from its

applicability any patent whose earliest effective filing date is prior to September 30, 1996. This
provision raises the value of any medical procedure method claims in applications that claim

priority to an effective filing date prior to September 30, 1996.").
62 1 Donald S. Chisum, Patents § 1.03[3] (2002).
63 Brett G. Alten, Left to One's Devices: Congress Limits Patents on Medical Procedures, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 837, 838 (1998).
64 Steven L. Nichols, Hippocrates,the Patent Holder: The Unenforceability of Medical
ProcedurePatent, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 228 (1997).
65 Duane Nash, Recommended Response for Human Cloning Patent Applications, 42
IDEA 279, 301 (2000) (footnote omitted).
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that only "medical treatment method patents" were on the minds of
those involved in the debate leading to the enactment of 35 U.S.C. §
287(c) as well as the commentators, who have since spoken, is also
apparent from the titles of the many of the journal articles referenced
in this paper.
LANGUAGE OF

IV.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c)

This section provides a glimpse at some of the issues that a judge may
face when attempting to construe the language of the statute.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) recites: "With respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical activity that constitutes an infringement under ... this title, the provisions [providing a civil remedy,
allowing for injunction, providing for damages, and providing for
attorney fees in the event of patent infringement] shall not apply
against the medical practitioner .... " This statute does exclude all
patentable categories 66 of inventions except for process patents: "but
[immunized medical activity] shall not include (i) the use of a patented
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such
patent.... "67 It does also exclude process patents drawn to the method
of using a drug and biotechnology process patents: "the practice of a
patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent" or
"the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent. '68 In
view of the language and the legislative history of the statute, drug,
device, and biotechnology patents, and treatment method patents that
derive their patentability from the use of a drug, device, or a biotechno69
logical innovation, may not be infringed with immunity.
66 There are four patentable categories recognized by Title 35 of the U.S. Code: Process,
machine, manufacture, and composition of matter. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
67 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(i) (2004).
68 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) (2004).
69 See, e.g., Cong. Rec. 9/28/96, H 11662, § 616. Limitation on Patent Infringements
Relating to a Medical Practitioner's Performance of a Medical Activity; Sherizaan Minwalla,
A Modest Proposal to Amend the"Patent Code 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) to Allow Health Care
Providersto Examine Their Patients'DNA, 26 S. ILL. U. L. J. 471 (2001?); Jasmine Chambers,
PatentEligibilityof BiotechnologicalInventions in the UnitedStates, Europe, and Japan:How
Much Patent Policy is Public Policy, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 223 (2002); Warren D.
Woessner and Michael A. Dryja, PatentLaw Amendment Provides Swift Relieffor US Doctors,
IP WORLDWIDE MAGAZINE, March/April 1997; Richard J. Berman, Limitation on Patent
Infringement Relating to a Medical Practitioner's Performance of a Medical Activity: A
Summary, available at http://ArentFox.com.
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w
The statute does not specify the category 70 or subject matter
of a patent infringed by the performance of medical activity whose
infringement has been immunized by the statute. Neither does the
statute impact the patentability of treatment methods or methods for
performance of a medical activity. Rather, the statute makes presumably valid process patents unenforceable vis a vis certain groups of
infringers who commit their infringement during performance of certain activities.
Accordingly, the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) hinges not
on the subject matter of the patent being infringed but on the issues of
whether the infringer was a bona fide "medical practitioner," and
whether the infringer's activity, which constituted infringement, also
constituted a protected "medical activity." No reported U.S. cases have
interpreted this statute since its enactment in 1996. While a judge
could be aided by ample foreign case law in determining whether an
application is drawn to a treatment method, he will have to interpret the
phrases "medical activity" and "medical practitioner" anew without the
aid of any authoritative or persuasive precedent.

A. Activity Focus of the U.S. Statute Contrastedto PatentFocus of
TRIPs and EPC
Unlike TRIPs and EPC provisions that specify the subject
matter of procedures that are unpatentable, the U.S. statute specifies the
type of activity that may be performed with immunity from infringement of valid patents. 72 While the category and subject matter of
patents, whose infringement is immunized, are not defined in their own
right, the statute alludes to them as patents that may be infringed by
"performance of a medical activity. '73 The focus of the language is on
the type of infringing activity not the category or subject matter of the
patent being infringed. 74
70

Process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.

71

Surgical procedure, medical device, biotechnological invention, or drug.
TRIPs art. 27(3); EPC art. 52(4); 35 U.S.C. 287(c) (2002).

72

73 Activities constituting infringement are: Making, using, offering to sell, or selling any
patented invention, within the U.S. or importing into the U.S. any patented invention during
the term of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)(1999). As 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) is effectively limited

to the category of process patents, the infringing activity will likely be "use" of the patented
process by performing it.
74 For an example of an article correctly recognizing the activity focus of the statute, see
e.g., Duane Nash, Recommended Response for Human Cloning Patent Applications, 42 IDEA
279, 279 (2000) ("[T]he patent infringement immunity given to 'medical activities' by § 616
of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1996 ('Act') should not be relied upon
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Courts need yet clarify, what kinds of activities constitute the
protected "medical activity" of the statute. Subsection (c)(2)(A) defines "medical activity" as "the performance of a medical or surgical
procedure on a body. ' 75 The statute expressly excludes the use of a
patented drug, device or a biotechnology system or method from the
immunity granted, and the legislative history provides further guidance
as to what does not constitute a "medical activity" covered by the
statute. 76 But, what does constitute a covered "medical activity" is not
directly set forth in the positive.
While the identity of the proponents and opponents of a statute
is not an authoritative source of statutory interpretation, identifying the
interest groups that lobbied for and against a provision may shed light
on whose interests may have been accommodated. For example,
because plastic surgeons argued for the passage of the statute, a flag is
raised indicating that the legislature had their interests in view if not in
mind, and cosmetic plastic surgery was probably considered for inclusion as an immunized activity. Veterinarians did not lobby for this
statute and it is clear that the statute does not consider veterinary
77
treatment of animals to be a medical activity.
It is not clear whether the statute considers dental treatment as
a medical activity. An argument may be made that "medical activity"
does not include dental activity. Subsection (c)(2)(C) defines "related
health care facility" and includes examples of a "related health care
facility" as "including but not limited to a nursing home, hospital, unito prevent enforcement of human cloning patents").
75 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2001); See generally Id. ("Forpurposes of this subsection ...(E) the
term "body" shall mean a human body, organ or cadaver, or a nonhuman animal used in
medical research or instruction directly relating to the treatment of humans." The term "body"
is defined by statute to include human or nonhuman animal or cadaver. The cadaver or the
nonhuman animal, however, has to be used in research or instruction directly relating to
finding a cure for treatment of humans. In other words, 35 U.S.C. 287 only applies to medical
activity for the ultimate purpose of treating human bodies and the statute does not apply to
veterinary medicine and treatment of animals for their own sake).
76 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-863, at 852-53 (1996) ("The term 'medical activity' as
defined in subsection 287(c)(2)(A) does not include 'the practice of a patented used of a
composition of matter.' ... '[P]atented use of a composition of matter' does not include any
claim for performing a medical or a surgical procedure on a body that recites the use of the
composition of matter where the use of the composition of matter does not directly contribute
to the achievement of the objective of the claimed method. ... For a 'hybrid' claim, ie., a claim
with at least one step that recites the use of a composition of matter and at least one step that is
not directed to the use of a composition of matter (e.g., a surgical step), [a test set forth in the
statute] must be applied to determine whether the claim as a whole is exempted from the
definition of a 'medical activity' because it is a patented use of a composition of matter").
77See supra note 75 (defining "body" according to the statute).
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versity, medical school, health maintenance organization, group medical practice, or a medical clinic." Absent, not only from the language
of the statute but also from its legislative history, are the terms "dentist"
and "dental." The Medical Procedure Patent Coalition, that lobbied for
limitation of liability, included numerous medical but no dental societies. Also, while the AMA has emphatically registered its opinion on
this matter, the American Dental Association has been absent from the
debate. Further, only some categories of dental procedures may be
categorized as immunized surgical procedures. Patents within many
subclasses of the class for dentistry 78 are not directed to surgical
procedures. For example, the subclass directed to the "method of
positioning or aligning teeth," 79 the subclass directed to "holding or
positioning denture in mouth,"8" or portions of the subclass directed to
the "method or material for testing, treating, restoring, or removing
natural teeth" 8' are arguably not directed to medical or surgical activity
covered by the statute. Infringing a patent, while performing any of
these activities, is probably subject to liability.
Another example of issues that need to be addressed was raised
by a commentator arguing that since 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) defines
medical activity as the performance of a medical or surgical procedure,
insofar as software or computer systems are not medical or surgical
procedures, this section should not cover the patents drawn to such
software or computer system.8 2 The commentator was taking for
granted that only treatment method patents fall within the purview of
the statute. However, his argument may be rephrased with an activity
focus as: Whether using a piece of computer software or a computer
system for deciphering the results of a medical test is a medical activity
immunized by the statute.
A general problem with the activity focus, as opposed to the patent
focus, of the statute is the order in which scrutiny and conflict occur.
Inventors seeking patents on their treatment methods go through the
application process of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office before
there can be any litigation over infringement. A medical practitioner
78 See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF CLASSIFICATION, class 433

(2000), availableat http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/classification/uspc433/sched433.pdf
79 Id. class 433, subclass 24.
80 Id. class 433, subclass 172.
81 Id. class 433, subclass 215.

82 Warren D. Woessner and Michael A. Dryja, PatentLaw Amendment Provides Swift
Relieffor US Doctors, IP WORLDWIDE MAGAZINE, March/April 1997.
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that has infringed a patent is subject to a court determination of whether
he was engaged in performance of a medical activity after he has
already been sued for patent infringement. There is no administrative
body tasked with determining which activities constitute a medical
activity and the example of EPO law indicates that lines of demarcation
are not so bright.
B. Who Are MedicalPractitioners?
According to subsection (c)(1) of the statute: "With respect to
a medical practitioner's performance of a medical activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the
provisions of sections 281, 283, 284 and 285 of this title shall not apply
against the medical practitioner or against a related health care entity
with respect to such medical activity." Thus, only "with respect to a
medical practitioner's performance of a medical activity that constitutes an infringement" are the remedy and damages provisions of the
patent statute unenforceable. 83 Subsection (c)(2)(B) defines "medical
practitioner" as "any natural person who is licensed by a State to
provide the medical activity described in subsection (c)(1) or who is
acting under the direction of such person in the performance of the
medical activity." A person or entity not falling under the definition of
medical practitioner may not practice the patented treatment method
with impunity. Moreover, a person qualifying as a "medical practitioner" under the statute would not enjoy immunity if he engages in a
"medical activity," other than the medical activity for which he is
licensed. It is not clear whether dentists or veterinarians are medical
83 Aside from the fact that doctors lobbied, therefore doctors are immune, the statute
seems to have resolved the policy considerations behind this provision without any discussion.
An interpreting court will have to guess as to the policy if the policy is to aid the construction.
The U.S. law may have limited the immunity to licensed professionals out of concern for public
safety. Yet, one might argue that there are other civil and criminal laws that regulate
unauthorized practice of medicine. This aspect of 35 U.S.C. 287(c) is in contrast to EPO law
that does not turn on the identity of the entity practicing the treatment method. European Patent
Office, Decision of Technical Board of Appeal 3.2.2 (September 29, 1999) T 0035/99-3.2.2,

availableat http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t990035epl.htm.

In the case of

mass treatment of animals mentioned supra in footnote 56, the patent applicant had argued that
the method when carried out by a farmer was industrial activity and therefore patentable. The
EPO technical board of appeal decided that it was "[n]ot possible as a matter of law to draw a
distinction between such a method as carried out by a farmer and the same method as carried
out by a veterinarian." European Patent Office, Decision of Technical Board of Appeal T
00116/85 3.3.1 (Oct. 14, 1987), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/

t850116epl.htm. EPO law seems to emphasize the nature of the activity over the identity of
the person carrying it out.
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practitioners. And, the licensing laws of a state will weigh in on
determining who the "medical practitioners" of that state are. What
degree of supervision would satisfy "acting under the direction of a
medical practitioner" is another unknown.
C. QuestionableImpact of Legislative History

As a general rule of statutory construction, a statute is construed
to give effect to both the language of the statute and the intent of the
legislature with language carrying the more considerable weight. "I
read the statute so as to give effect to its language."8 4 "[T]he starting
point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.
Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. '85 "As in all cases
involving statutory construction, our starting point must be the language employed by Congress, and we assume that the legislative
purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used. Thus,
absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. '86
The significance of legislative history is itself a disputed point:
"Traditionally, the legislative history of a U.S. public law is looked to
by federal agencies, attorneys and the courts in order to determine the
Congressional intent of a particular statute or one of its provisions,
especially if the plain reading of the statutory text is somewhat ambiguous.... At the very least, a legislative history will usually answer the
general question about why Congress is making a particular law or
particular title of a law. However, what Congress intended when they
enacted a particular provision in a law or what they meant by a
particular word or phrase in a law is usually harder to decipher. In
recent decades, many law review articles have been written that have
debated the merits of relying on documents that are not themselves
legislative enactments.... Many critics, like Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia, advocate a strict textual interpretation of public laws.
This criticism has lead [sic] to a dampening of the use of federal
legislative histories in some federal courts .... "87
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F3d 956, 971 (Fed Cir. 2002) (Lourie, J.,
concurring on denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
85 Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
86 American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
87 Richard J. MacKinney and Ellen A. Sweet, Federal Legislative History Research: A
Practitioner's Guide to Compiling the Documents And Sifting for Legislative Intent, 2001
84
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Although no one studying the history of the statute can doubt in
good faith that the statute was enacted with medical treatment method
patents in focus, there may be several problems with construing the
statute to limit the granted immunity to immunity for infringement of
treatment method patents. The main piece of legislative history for 35
U.S.C. § 287(c), the associated conference report, is written as broadly
as the statute and does not specify that the immunity granted by the
statute applies to infringement of treatment method patents alone.
Further, given the textualist tendency of the recent years, the statute is
susceptible of being interpreted as broadly as written.
In recent years, the interpretative paradigm has moved, quite
dramatically, [in the direction of textualism].... Text, once a mere
player in the broader search for legislative meaning, has now taken
center stage--framed by its champions as the end of the statutory
inquiry itself, rather than a subservient means to some other end.
Arguments rooted in non-textual considerations, if not totally eviscer88
ated, are not held in favor by the courts.
V.
LANGUAGE BEYOND INTENT

The international background, the history of the statute, and the
commentators all point to the same concept that 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) was
enacted to make treatment method patents unenforceable in the specific
circumstances articulated by the statute. 89 The language of the statute
achieves this goal. The language of the statute, however, goes further,
making all types of process patents unenforceable against an infringing
medical practitioner engaged in performance of a medical activity. 90
Of course, drug and biotechnology related process patents are expressly
Law Librarians' Society of Washington D.C., Inc., http://www.llsdc.org (2003).
88 Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in An Age of Textualism: A Practitioner'sGuide
to Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation,35 AKRON L. REv. 451,453 (2002) (arguing that

despite the existence of contradictory canons of statutory interpretation, at any particular point
in time, there is generally only one set of interpretative principles that carry the favor of the
courts). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621

(1990).
89 See generally 61 Fed. Reg. at 10320-23; Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-208, § 616; 1 Donald S. Chisum, Patents § 1.03[3] (2002); Brett G. Alten,
Left to One's Devices: Congress Limits Patents on Medical Procedures,8 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 837, 838 (1998).
90 As explained earlier, patentable categories of machine, article of manufacture, and

composition of matter are excluded from the coverage of the statute leaving only process
patents subject to the immunity granted for infringement. 35 U.S.C. 287(c)(2)(A)(i).
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excluded from the reach of the statute. Express exceptions of the
product categories 9 and express exclusion of drug and biotechnology
subject matters may also aid arguments in favor of the broader interpretation: Had Congress intended to exclude a particular process patent
from infringement immunity, it would have done so as it did product
patent or drug and biotechnology process patents. 92 Under this reasoning, all other process patents would be game.
The statute as written is, therefore, overbroad. The language of
the legislative history is also general and can include all process
patents. 93 The previous sections show that despite the narrow intent
clear in the history of the statute and taken for granted by commentators, an overbroad language is in danger of overbroad interpretation.
This section explains how the language stretches beyond treatment
method patents while including them.
A. 35 US.C. § 287(c) Makes More than TreatmentMethod Patents
Unenforceable
In a law suit asserting infringement of a patent, 35 U.S.C. §
287(c) is implicated at a point when the court has already determined
that the patent at issue in the case was valid and is infringed by the acts
of the defendant. The issue addressed by 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) is whether
the infringer is nonetheless immune from liability for his infringing
actions. Under this statute, the infringer is immune if he was a
"medical practitioner" and performed a "medical activity" that constituted an infringement of this patent. The determination of whether the
medical practitioner was engaged in "performance of a medical activity" is related, but not equivalent, to determining whether the patent at
issue in the case is drawn to a treatment method or a method of
"performance of a medical activity."
91 Machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of matter patents are all product

patents.

92 See, e.g., Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995)

(discussing the "negative pregnant

argument" of statutory construction).
93 As mentioned earlier, the main piece of legislative history to be consulted by an
interpreting court § 616 of the Conference Report to accompany H.R. 3610, 104th Cong.

(1996), which does not contain any reference to the emphasis of the statute on treatment
method patents either. This piece of legislative history is focused on discussing the exceptions
granted to drug and biotechnology industries. See, e.g., Cong. Rec. 9/28/96, H11662, § 616.

Limitation on Patent Infringements Relating to a Medical Practitioner's Performance of a
Medical Activity. The "legislative history" in a broader sense of the phrase is of course why
we know the statute was truly directed at medical treatment method patents alone.
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The distinction between the two related issues lies in the definition of infringement. For an accused process to infringe a patent claim,
all of the claim's limitations must be present in the accused process
either literally or by a substantial equivalent. 94 In the case of a method
claim, the infringer must perform each and every element of the
patented claim. If what he performs lacks even one element of the
claim, he is not infringing that claim. On the other hand, if he performs
the claim elements and then takes additional steps, he is still infringing.
Performance of a medical activity may consist of performing all of the
elements of a method claim and additional steps not included in the
claim. Performing this medical activity, that includes steps beyond the
patented elements, is "performance of a medical activity that constitutes an infringement." The steps of this medical activity, however, are
not in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of the claim being
infringed. So, the claim being infringed need not itself be drawn to a
method of performance of a medical activity or a treatment method.
A hypothetical scenario further illustrates the implications of
the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). Suppose that a patented
cosmetic procedure is not considered to be a medical activity under
U.S. law. If a beautician performs this cosmetic procedure, she is
infringing the patent and subject to liability for her infringement. If a
medical practitioner performs this cosmetic procedure, he is also infringing the patent and subject to infringement liability. If, however,
the medical practitioner adds steps that turn his activity into a medical
activity, then he has infringed the patent during the performance of a
medical activity or he has engaged in "performance of a medical
activity that constitutes an infringement." He is immune from liability
even though the procedure he intended to perform was not a medical
activity and even though the patent he infringed was not drawn to a
method of performing a medical activity. The added steps by the
medical practitioner may be completely superfluous with the exclusive
intention of abusing the immunity granted by the statute. 95 Under this
scenario, the beautician who performs the same procedure does not
have the options for evading liability that are available to the infringing
doctor.
94 Vehicular Tech. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l, Inc., 141 F.3d 1084, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
91 A mirror image of this scenario was presented by one author who explores the
legislative history for the purpose of advising patentees on how to evade the reach of the statute
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In such situations, a court would sort those who are legitimately
within the purview of the statute from those who are not and would
assure that performing the broader medical activity has not been a
means of abusing the protection granted by the statute. To determine
whether the infringing medical practitioner was involved in
"performance of a medical activity" as opposed to an activity whose
real thrust was otherwise, the court could look to the considerations of
the type discussed by the legislative history of the statute in the context
of distinguishing claims whose real thrust is a novel method of using a
composition of matter from claims who recite a method of using a
composition of matter merely as a means of falling within the excep96
tion granted by the statute.
immunizing infringement of their patents. Richard P. Burgoon, Jr., Silk Purses,Sows Ears and
Other Nuances Regarding 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69 (1996).
Infringement of a patent is not subject to the immunity granted by the statute, if the patent is
drawn to a composition of matter or derives its utility, novelty, or nonobviousness from the use
of a composition of matter included in the claims. See Cong. Rec. 9/28/96, H 11662, § 616.
Limitation on Patent Infringements Relating to a Medical Practitioner's Performance of a
Medical Activity. The legislative history describes a test established by section 287(c)(2)(F)
as first determining the objective of the claimed method taking into account all of the process
steps set forth in the claim and second determining whether the steps involving the use of the
composition of matter either alone or in combination contribute directly to the achievement of
the objective of the claimed method. Cong. Rec. 9/28/96, HI 1662, § 616. Limitation on Patent
Infringements Relating to a Medical Practitioner's Performance of a Medical Activity. If the
use of the drug is crucial to the claim, then the claim would be one drawn to the drug or a new
use of the drug and would be enforceable. The author of this article observes that because
claims are reviewed "as a whole," issued patent claims directed to process steps are not
dissected to determine if each step in the process is novel, nonobvious and useful. Richard P.
Burgoon, Jr., Silk Purses, Sows Ears and Other Nuances Regarding35 U.S. C. § 287(c), 4 4 U.
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69, 86 (1996). Thus, the author continues, if a claim includes an
obvious step, such as use of a patented antibiotic to prevent infection, then by definition the
antibiotic contributed to the nonobviousness of the claim as a whole. Id. The author recommends that the patent applicant further buttress its position by adding statements to the
specification indicating that an objective of the surgical procedure was to ensure minimizing
the chance of infection and to achieve this objective the procedure mandates using an antibiotic. Id. By such maneuvering, a process claim, whose infringement is fair game for doctors, is
dressed as a drug claim, whose infringement is actionable. Just as patent attorneys can turn a
method claim into a drug claim, doctors can turn a non-medical activity into an immunized
medical activity.
96 See the discussion of hybrid claims in Cong. Rec. 9/28/96, HI 1662, § 616. Limitation
on Patent Infringements Relating to a Medical Practitioner's Performance of a Medical
Activity. An excerpt from this discussion follows: "An example, in the case of a surgical
method for transplanting a healthy heart into a patient with a diseased heart, the inclusion of a
step of administering a conventional anaesthetic in a claim reciting a novel and non-obvious
surgical transplantation procedure would not cause the surgical procedure to be treated as a
patented use of a composition of matter within the meaning of subsection (c)(2)(A)(ii).
Therefore, assuming none of the other exception is subsection (c)(2)(A) apply, the claimed
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B. Infringinga Treatment Method PatentIs Medical Activity
This paper concurs that, in addition to patents on drugs and
medical devices, patents that are more likely to be infringed by a
medical practitioner, in performance of a medical activity, are treatment method patents. This section shows that under the language of
the statute, infringement of treatment method patents by a medical
practitioner is immune from liability as intended by the legislature and
argued by the commentators.
As explained above, the language of the statute does not turn on
the subject matter of the process patent being infringed. Rather than
determining whether the process patent infringed was drawn to a
method of treatment, a court examining the applicability of 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(c) has to determine whether the type of activity performed by the
medical practitioner was a "medical activity." Nevertheless, in many
cases, the issue of whether the activity performed by the practitioner
was a medical activity is automatically resolved when the court determines that the patent infringed was drawn to a method of performance
of a medical activity.
Medical practitioners infringing patents drawn to treatment
methods or methods of "performance of a medical activity" are always
immune under 35 U.S.C. §287(c) because infringing this type of patent,
without doing more, is by definition an immunized "performance of a
medical activity." The medical practitioner need not improvise extra
steps to turn his infringing activity into a medical activity. Thus, once
the court determines that the infringed patent was claiming a method of
"performance of a medical activity" and that the person infringing was
a medical practitioner, the infringer is immune from liability and the
patentee will get no remedy.
On the other hand, medical practitioners infringing a patent that
is not inherently drawn to a method of "performance of a medical
activity" may or may not be immunized by the statute. After the court
determines that the infringed patent did not claim a method of
"performance of a medical activity" and that the infringer was a
medical practitioner, the court must still determine whether the medical
surgical method would necessarily qualify as a medical activity. In contrast, where the
administration of anaesthesia was accomplished, for example, using a novel anaesthetic or a
novel dosing schedule, the objective of the claimed method would include the provision of a
novel use of an anaesthetic in transplantation surgery and the use of the composition of matter
(i.e., the anaesthetic) would directly contribute to the achievement of the objective."
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practitioner infringed the patent in the course of "performance of a
medical activity." If the medical practitioner infringed the patent not
in the course of performance of a protected "medical activity" within
the meaning of the statute, then he would be liable for infringement. If
the medical practitioner infringed the patent in the course of performing a "medical activity," then even though the patent itself is not drawn
to a treatment method and even though the patent is infringed, the
medical practitioner is nonetheless immune.
VI.
CONCLUSION

This paper explores the boundaries of immunity from liability
for infringement of process patents that was created by the enactment
of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) in 1996. The paper examines the language of the
statute in the absence of relevant U.S. case law. The paper shows that
based on the language of the statute, a medical practitioner engaged in
performance of a medical activity is immune from liability for infringing treatment method patents as well as any other kind of process patent
except expressly excluded drug and biotechnology process patents. A
court deciding the applicability of the immunity may decide to first
resolve whether the claims infringed are drawn to a treatment method,
or a method of performance of a medical activity. If the claims
infringed are treatment method claims, the infringing medical practitioner is immune because by the very infringement of the claims, he did
engage in performance of a medical activity. However, as long as the
claims infringed are process claims, even if not drawn to a treatment
method, the medical practitioner may still be immune if he infringed
the claims in the course of performance of a medical activity.
As such, the reach of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) may go further than
that intended by Congress and further than EPO law that prohibits
patenting of treatment methods but does not immunize medical practitioners from liability for infringement of valid process patents in other
areas. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) was thought to reach a compromise between
opposing sides by leaving the patentability of treatment methods intact.
However, in the light of the overbroad statutory language, opting to
make treatment methods unpatentable in accord with most foreign laws
would have been advantageous for some opponents of the statute.
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APPENDIX A

35 U.S.C. § 287(c)
(c)(1) With respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a
medical activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a)
or (b) of this title, the provisions of sections 281 [providing a civil
remedy for patent infringement], 283 [allowing for injunction in the
event of patent infringement], 284 [providing for damages in the event
of patent infringement] and 285 [providing for attorneys fees] of this
title shall not apply against the medical practitioner or against a related
health care entity with respect to such medical activity.
(2) For the purposes of this subsection:
(A) the term "medical activity" means the performance of a
medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include
(i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use
of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the
practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.
(B) the term "medical practitioner" means any natural person
who is licensed by a State to provide the medical activity described in
subsection (c)(1) or who is acting under the direction of such person in
the performance of the medical activity.
(C) the term "related health care entity" shall mean an entity
with which a medical practitioner has a professional affiliation under
which the medical practitioner performs the medical activity, including
but not limited to a nursing home, hospital, university, medical school,
health maintenance organization, group medical practice, or a medical
clinic.
(D) the term "professional affiliation" shall mean staff privileges, medical staff membership, employment or contractual relationship,
partnership or ownership interest, academic appointment, or other
affiliation under which a medical practitioner provides the medical
activity on behalf of, or in association with, the health care entity.
(E) the term "body" shall mean a human body, organ or cadaver, or a nonhuman animal used in medical research or instruction
directly relating to the treatment of humans.
(F) the term "patented use of a composition of matter" does not
include a claim for a method of performing a medical or surgical
procedure on a body that recites the use of a composition of matter

42

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL

[Vol.3:13

does not directly contribute to achievement of the objective of the
claimed method.
(G) the term "State" shall mean any state or territory of the
United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico.
(3) This subsection does not apply to the activities of any
person, or employee or agent of such person (regardless of whether
such person is a tax exempt organization under section 501(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code), who is engaged in the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy or
clinical laboratory services (other than clinical laboratory services
provided in a physician's office), where such activities are:
(A) directly related to the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory services (other than clinical laboratory services provided in a
physician's office), and
(B) regulated under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
the Public Health Service Act, or the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Act.
(4) This subsection shall not apply to any patent issued before
the date of enactment of this subsection."
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APPENDIX

B

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Selected portions of Section 616 of the Conference Report [to
accompany H.R. 3610], September 28, 1996, follow:
"The conference agreement includes section 616, which includes language not in either the House or Senate-reported bill. The
provision included in this conference agreement precludes the filing of
civil action for damages or injunctive relief against a medical practitioner licensed by the State to provide the medical activity that would
otherwise constitute an infringement or inducement to infringe under
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) or (b) for patents issued after its enactment.
The term "medical activity" as defined in subsection
287(c)(2)(A) does not include "the practice of a patented used of a
composition of matter." The term "patented use of a composition of
matter" as used in subsection (c)(2)(A)(ii) is limited by subsection
(c)(2)(F). Subsection (c)(2)(F) provides that the term "patented use of
a composition of matter" does not include any claim for performing a
medical or a surgical procedure on a body that recites the use of the
composition of matter where the use of the composition of matter does
not directly contribute to the achievement of the objective of the
claimed method. A use of a composition of matter as a step in a claim
will direct [sic] contribute to the achievement of the objective of the
claimed method if it is itself novel or if it contributes to or is necessary
to establish the non-obviousness of the claim as a whole.
For a method claim in which each of the method steps recites a
"use of a composition of matter" the claim cannot represent a "medical
activity" because the use of a composition of matter must necessarily
contribute to the novelty - and, therefore, to the objective - of the

claimed method. "Uses of compositions of matter" include, without
limitation, novel uses of drugs, novel uses of chemical or biological
reagents for diagnostic purposes, novel method for scheduling or
timing administration of drugs, novel methods for combining drug
therapies, and novel methods for providing genetic or other biological
materials to a patient (including gene therapies." A particular example
would be a claim that recites only the novel use of a drug for the
treatment of diabetes that involves the administration of a drug at a
particular time of day on/or at a specified dose and/or with a specified
concomitant medicinal therapy could not be construed as a "medical
activity."

44

BUFFALO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLA WJOURNAL

[Vol.3:13

For a "hybrid" claim, ie., a claim with at least one step that
recites the use of a composition of matter and at least one step that is
not directed to the use of a composition of matter (e.g., a surgical step),
the test established by subsection (c)(2)(F) must be applied to determine whether the claim as a whole is exempted from the definition of
a "medical activity" because it is a patented use of a composition of
matter. The first step in this test is to determine objective of the
claimed method taking into account all of the process steps set forth in
the claim. The second part of this test is to determine whether steps
involving the use of one or more compositions of matter either alone or
in combination contribute directly to the achievement of the objective
of the claimed method. It is interesting [sic] that this part of the test
will have been met if the uses of the compositions of matter, either
individually or collectively, represents novel subject matter, or if one
or more of these steps contributes to or are necessary to establish the
non-obviousness of the claim as a whole. Thus, even where the steps
involving used of one or more compositions of matter are not novel
individually or in combination with each other, these uses may still
directly contribute to the achievement of the objective of the claimed
method if, in combination with the steps that involve collectively
obvious medical or surgical techniques, they produce a novel and
non-obvious method.
An example, in the case of a surgical method for transplanting
a healthy heart into a patient with a diseased heart, the inclusion of a
step of administering a conventional anaesthetic in a claim reciting a
novel and non-obvious surgical transplantation procedure would not
cause the surgical procedure to be treated as a patented use of a
composition of matter within the meaning of subsection (c)(2)(A)(ii).
Therefore, assuming none of the other exception is subsection
(c)(2)(A) apply, the claimed surgical method would necessarily qualify
as a medical activity. In contrast, where the administration of anaesthesia was accomplished, for example, using a novel anaesthetic or a novel
dosing schedule, the objective of the claimed method would include the
provision of a novel use of an anaesthetic in transplantation surgery and
the use of the composition of matter (i.e., the anaesthetic) would
directly contribute to the achievement of the objective.
It is intended that the applicability of the exception in
(c)(2)(A)(ii) for a patented use of a composition of matter can usually
be decided by a motion to dismiss or summary judgment under Rule
12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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For example, an accused infringer seeking to invoke the relief from
remedies afforded under 287(c)(1) would ordinarily prevail under such
a motion if the following conditions are met: (1) the movant shows by
clear and convincing evidence that the recited uses of the compositions
of matter, both individually and collectively, lack novelty, and (2) the
movant also shows by a preponderance of evidence that the steps of the
claimed method that do not involve uses of compositions of matter (ie.,
the medical or surgical procedure steps) are, by themselves, novel and
non-obvious, provided, however, that the movant may concede the
non-obviousness in lieu of making the required evidentiary showing."

